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MAP EXPLANATION
After finding that the Court had jurisdiction, Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion in United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), reached the merits
and concluded that the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) was in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
In his dissent, Justice Scalia attacked the majority’s
doctrinal reasoning on the merits as “nonspecific
hand-waving” that invalidated DOMA “maybe on
equal-protection grounds, maybe on substantive-dueprocess grounds, and perhaps with some amorphous
federalism component playing a role.” Id. at 2707
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
This Map responds to Justice Scalia’s accusation by
illustrating the doctrinal origins of Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion. Specifically, the Map shows how
both the equal protection and substantive due process
doctrines have contributed to a constitutional
jurisprudence that affirms the rights of same-sex
couples. The accompanying case descriptions
highlight reasoning and quotes that ultimately
influenced the majority opinion in Windsor.
Moreover, the Map takes the sting from Justice
Scalia’s complaint that the majority failed to conduct
a proper substantive due process analysis. Justice
Scalia argued that the opinion failed to ask whether
same-sex marriage was a right “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition,” id. at 2707 (quoting
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721
(1997)), and failed to articulate a “tier[] of scrutiny”
when considering whether DOMA violated equal
protection, id. at 2706. As demonstrated in the Map,
however, the Court has long applied tests other than
Justice Scalia’s when conducting both substantive
due process and equal protection review. Indeed,
Justice Kennedy’s doctrinal approach is consistent
with precedent and the doctrinal traditions advanced
by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Blackmun.
Note: This Map is not the territory. It does not
purport to represent every case backing the majority’s
approach in due process or equal protection doctrine.
Rather, it highlights representative and influential
opinions that define the basic genealogy of Justice
Kennedy’s doctrinal argument. Similarly, the Map
does not draw every citation connection between
opinions; arrows instead represent the key doctrinal
lines in the same-sex marriage debate. Finally, note
that opinion triangles grow in size based on the
number of citations to the opinion represented on the
Map.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
Although the phrase “substantive due process” did
not appear in Pierce, the case stands as a prominent
example of that nascent doctrine. Justice
McReynolds’s majority opinion struck down an
Oregon statute that required public education for all
children, finding the law “unreasonably interfere[d]
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of [their] children.” Id. at
534–35. Justice McReynolds noted that the
Constitution’s “fundamental theory of liberty . . .
excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children.” Id. at 535.
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S.
535 (1942)
Before Skinner, equal protection challenges to state
legislation usually failed. Yet Justice Douglas’s
majority opinion struck down Oklahoma’s Habitual
Criminal Sterilization Act under the Equal Protection
Clause. The Act punished those thrice convicted of

larceny with sterilization but spared repeat
embezzlers. Describing marriage and procreation as
“basic civil rights,” Justice Douglas concluded
“[w]hen the law lays an unequal hand on those who
have committed intrinsically the same quality of
offense . . . it has made as invidious a discrimination
as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for
oppressive treatment.” Id. at 541.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
In Griswold, the Court struck down a Connecticut
law prohibiting the sale or use of contraceptives.
Justice Douglas’s majority opinion held the law, as
applied to married couples, violated the constitutional
right to privacy. “We deal with a right of privacy
older than the Bill of Rights—older than our political
parties, older than our school system. Marriage is . . .
an association that promotes a way of life, not causes;
a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial or social projects.” Id. at
486.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
In Loving, the unanimous Court struck down
Virginia’s miscegenation law on both equal
protection and due process grounds. In his opinion,
Chief Justice Warren applied strict scrutiny and
concluded that the law discriminated invidiously. He
also cited Skinner for the proposition that marriage is
a basic civil right and concluded that “deny[ing] this
fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis . . .
[is] so directly subversive of the principle of equality
at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . [that it]
deprive[s] all the State's citizens of liberty without
due process of law.” Id. at 12.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
In Eisenstadt, the Court struck down a Massachusetts
law that prohibited distribution of contraceptives to
unmarried persons. In his plurality opinion, Justice
Brennan ostensibly applied rational basis scrutiny but
nonetheless rejected all of the state’s asserted
rationales for the law. Justice Brennan argued that
“[i]f under Griswold the distribution of
contraceptives to married persons cannot be
prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons
would be equally impermissible,” as the relevant
right to privacy inheres in the individual rather than
in couples. Id. at 453.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
Roe famously—and controversially—recognized a
substantive due process abortion right. Justice
Blackmun’s majority opinion claimed doctrinal
justification for a constitutional right of privacy from
the Griswold–Pierce line of cases as well as from
other lines including that from Skinner to Eisenstadt.
“This right of privacy,” wrote Justice Blackmun, “is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” Id. at
153.
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528 (1973)
In Moreno, the Court struck down a portion of a
federal law that denied food stamps to households
composed of unrelated individuals. Justice Brennan’s
majority opinion noted that the legislative history
showed that the provision was intended to deny
“hippies” and “hippie communes” food stamps. Id. at
534. Justice Brennan wrote, “[I]f the constitutional
conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest.” Id. Justice Kennedy directly cited Moreno

in Windsor and similarly questioned Congress’s
purpose in passing DOMA.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
The majority in Bowers, per Justice White, upheld
the constitutionality of Georgia’s sodomy statute
against a same-sex challenge. Like Justice Scalia in
Windsor, Justice White insisted that only liberties
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”
deserved constitutional recognition. Id. at 192
(quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.)).
Justice Blackmun forcefully dissented. He construed
the Court’s precedent differently and argued that the
Constitution protected “the right of an individual to
conduct intimate relationships in the intimacy of his
or her own home.” Id. at 208.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
The first of four Justice Kennedy majority opinions
in the Map, Casey (co-authored by Justices
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter) found that stare
decisis required upholding Roe’s recognition of a
woman’s right to choose an abortion before fetal
viability. Regarding the proper substantive due
process inquiry, Casey quoted Justice Harlan: Due
process “is the balance struck by this country, having
regard to what history teaches are the traditions from
which it developed as well as the traditions from
which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. . . . No
formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for
judgment and restraint.” Id. at 850 (quoting Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
In Romer, the Court struck down Colorado’s
Amendment 2 that purported to deny LGBT persons
special rights. Justice Kennedy, however, found the
law much broader––“[i]t identifies persons by a
single trait and then denies them protection across the
board. . . . It is not within our constitutional tradition
to enact laws of this sort.” Id. at 633. Arguing that the
law’s peculiar nature defied conventional rational
basis review, Justice Kennedy cited Moreno for its
proposition that a bare desire to harm unpopular
groups violates equal protection. In Windsor, Justice
Kennedy returned to this proposition and relied
heavily on Romer in striking down DOMA.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
In Lawrence, the Court overruled Bowers and struck
down Texas’s law against homosexual sodomy. In
his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy explicitly
embraced the substantive due process logic of Justice
Blackmun’s Bowers dissent and of the Casey
majority. Tellingly, Justice Kennedy also pointed to
Romer as evidence that the jurisprudential
foundations of Bowers had been eroded. Thus, Justice
Kennedy in Lawrence used an equal protection case
to justify finding a substantive due process right. In
Windsor, Justice Kennedy once again bridged the two
doctrines by citing Lawrence as reason to strike down
DOMA on equal protection grounds. Though Justice
Scalia’s Windsor and Lawrence dissents complained
about Justice Kennedy’s doctrinal crossbreeding, the
history revealed by this Map shows that equal
protection and substantive due process often form
two complimentary sides of the same constitutional
coin.
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